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UK audit committees and the Revised Code 
 
Purpose: The audit committee is one of the most prominent board sub-
committees, having a potentially important role to play in ensuring sound 
corporate governance.  This paper examines and discusses the behaviour of 
companies following revisions to the UK’s Revised Code.   
Research design/methodology/approach: A variety of annual report data from a 
sample of 50 UK companies, stratified according to size, is collected and 
analyzed. 
Findings: General compliance with many provisions of the Revised Code was 
found.  All but one company had an audit committee comprising solely non-
executive directors. However, in about a quarter of cases the chairman was a 
member, and in some cases directors were not ‘independent’ according to the 
Code’s definition.  Nevertheless, many companies exceeded the minimum 
stipulated requirements, for example the number of non-executive directors on the 
audit committee or the number of meetings held.  Some companies, though, did 
not follow recommended practice, particularly regarding the disclosure of 
information, and some explanations for non-compliance were weak. 
Implications: Compliance with disclosure demands regarding audit committees 
could be improved, as could the quality of explanations when the 
recommendations of the Code are not followed.  It would be sensible for 
regulators to monitor this, provide more detailed guidance and highlight examples 
of good practice. Given the resistance of many companies to corporate governance 
regulation and accusations of ‘box ticking’, future research should probe why 
many companies do more than is required or recommended.  The research should 
be repeated when further revisions to the Code are made in respect of audit 
committees, and practice in countries other than the UK should be researched to 




When compared with the board itself, relatively little attention has been paid to board 
sub-committees (Spira and Bender, 2004), in spite of their growing importance.  This 
is significant, for as corporate governance has evolved, so has the role of the audit 
committee, to the point where ‘it is arguably the most important board sub-
committee’ (Mallin, 2004, p. 98). Given the place of non-executive directors (NEDs) 
on the audit committee, this growth in importance can be seen as part of a trend ‘to 
establish and increase the independence and powers of non-executive directors’ 
(Clarke, 2007, p. 50).   
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The independence of NEDs on the board of directors is considered vital if they are to 
perform an effective monitoring role and thus ensure satisfactory ‘conformance’ on 
the part of executive management (see Spira and Bender, 2004) who, given the 
separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation (Berle and Means, 
1932), are prone to agency problems such as shirking and moral hazard (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The audit committee offers a check on executive directors’ potential 
manipulation of earnings, through reviewing the financial statements and associated 
accounting principles and practices, liaising with internal and external auditors, and 
reviewing the effectiveness of internal controls.   
 
A succession of UK initiatives has advocated the adoption of audit committees and 
made recommendations regarding their composition and operation. The ‘Revised 
Code’ of corporate governance was issued in July 2003 and applied to financial year 
ends from 31 October 2004 onwards.  As rules or guidelines continue to evolve, it is 
appropriate to examine how companies responded to this particular set of changes, 
especially since, as at late 2009, the UK Code is undergoing a major review. 
 
The aim of this paper is to determine the extent to which companies adopted the audit 
committee provisions of the Revised Code when it was introduced, and to identify and 
discuss significant issues that became apparent. Given the UK’s leadership, since the 
publication of the Cadbury Report, in “principles-based” approaches to corporate 
governance, such experience is of wider significance than just the UK, providing 
possible lessons for other jurisdictions.  The paper is structured as follows. The first 
main section provides a review of the literature, which falls into two broad types: first, 
the various policy documents that have guided the development of audit committees 
in the UK; and second, research literature on audit committees.  From this review are 
developed a set of research questions.  The second section describes the research 
design and methods.  The third and fourth sections, respectively, present and discuss 
the research findings.  The paper ends with conclusions and an outline of limitations 







Prior to the 1970s few companies in the UK had an audit committee, although they 
were more common in the US and Canada. Kalbers and Fogerty (1998) suggest that 
their inclusion in contemporary corporate governance should be seen as a reaction to 
corporate abuses, which would appear to be the case in the UK, with three peak 
periods in their formation: 1979 to 1981; 1986 to 1990; and 1992 to 1993 (Collier, 
1996). The first peak seems to have been a response to failures in auditing and 
accounting which arose in the latter half of the 1970s from a number of well 
publicised financial scandals such as Rolls Royce, Court Line and Pergamon Press. 
The second is identified with the spectacular corporate failures of the period – for 
example Polly Peck, Coloroll and BCCI – and the high level of debt in the corporate 
sector. These failures led to renewed pressure from both inside and outside the 
accounting profession, which resulted in the appointment of the Cadbury Committee 
and consequently the third peak in audit committee formation, since the Committee’s 
Code of Best Practice made it virtually mandatory for UK-listed companies to have 
one (Cadbury, 1992; see Tolley’s, 2003, p. 871). Audit committees are now 
widespread among listed companies in the US and UK (Hemscott, 2003; Spira and 
Bender, 2004), for example, thus limiting opportunities to research their impact. 
However, recent research that has been able to compare firms that have an audit 
committee with those that do not has found evidence that an audit committee adds 
value. In their comparison of foreign registrants in the US, Chen et al. (2008) found 
that those that chose not to establish an audit committee tended to have significantly 
lower earnings-return associations. 
 
The Cadbury Code recommended that the board should establish an audit committee 
of at least three non-executive directors (NEDs), at least two being independent, and 
that it should have written terms of reference.   The Cadbury Code was superseded by 
the Combined Code in 1998. Derived from the report of the Hampel Committee, 
which had been set up in 1995 to review the implementation of the recommendations 
of the Cadbury Code (Hampel, 1998) and the Greenbury report on directors’ 
remuneration, the Combined Code recommended that listed companies establish an 
audit committee with written terms of reference and at least three members, all of 
whom should be NEDs and the majority of whom should be independent. 
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The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (the Revised Code), which was issued 
in July 2003 (FRC, 2003), superseded the original Combined Code, following reviews 
by Derek Higgs on the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors (Higgs, 2003) 
and by Sir Robert Smith on audit committees (Smith, 2003).  It incorporates their 
guidelines. The Smith Guidance had recommended that: 
 
all members of the committee should be independent non-
executive directors and that the board should satisfy itself that at 
least one member of the audit committee has recent and relevant 
experience and appointments should be for a period of up to three 
years, extendable by no more than two additional three-year periods, 
so long as members continue to be independent. 
 
The section in bold is incorporated within the Revised Code (C.3.1) whilst the 
remainder forms part of The Smith Guidance to the Revised Code. Table 1 
summarises the development of the recommendations regarding audit committees. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, the requirements for audit committees have been 
modified gradually as a result of successive reports. Whereas the number of NEDs 
required for smaller (but not actually small) companies (those below the FTSE 350)1 
has been relaxed slightly, there has generally been an increasing emphasis on their 
independence. The Cadbury requirement of at least two independent NEDs meant that 
they could, in principle, have found themselves in a minority, a shortcoming that was 
remedied by the 1998 Combined Code.  
 
The Revised Code states that the board should determine whether a director is 
independent in character and judgement, and whether there are relationships or 
circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s 
judgement. Independence is overwhelmingly seen as the most significant attribute of 
an audit committee member (Windram and Song, 2004; see Mangena and Tauringana, 
2008). This is empirically supported by Chan and Li (2008) who, in their study of the 
                                                 
1
 FTSE 350 refers to the 350 largest companies by market capitalization listed on the London Stock 
Exchange.  It is made up of the FTSE 100 and the FTSE 250. 
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top 200 firms in the Fortune 500, found that the presence of expert-independent 
directors (i.e. top executives of another independent, publicly traded firm) tended to 
be associated with enhanced firm value. 
 
The independence of NEDs could be affected by a number of factors. One is whether 
a director has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first 
election; such a relationship requires disclosure. Keasey and Hudson (2002) argue that 
it is difficult for NEDs to make a meaningful contribution to performance without 
forming a working relationship with executives, but this in turn could affect their 
independence. Another is the existence of any ‘relationship’ between audit committee 
members and the external auditors; for example, if a NED has been employed by, or 
been a partner in, the firm of external auditors. Brennan and McDermott’s (2004) 
study of Irish listed companies identified four cases of former employees of the 
external auditors who were NEDs on the audit committee and no indication of time 
lapse since employment given; therefore independence could not be ascertained. The 
Revised Code comments that the board should state its reasons if it considers that a 
director is independent even though there are relationships or circumstances which 
might suggest otherwise. 
 
The Revised Code also deals with the roles and responsibilities of audit committees. 
These now include a review of the integrity of financial reporting, internal controls 
and risk management systems, monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of the 
internal audit function, and responsibility for overseeing the external audit process, 
including auditor independence and the provision of non-audit services.  
 
The role of NEDs in audit committees might clash with their other roles, depending 
on what contribution is expected from them as members of the board.  Pye and Camm 
(2003) produce a matrix of four types of NED role contribution by identifying two 
role dimensions – risk management and strategic contribution – which point towards 
responsibilities focused on monitoring and performance. Keasey and Hudson (2002) 
similarly argue that roles are to do with performance and accountability, but the 
precise role fulfilled by a particular NED would be expected to take into account the 
difference in assigned tasks resulting from differing sub-board committee 
membership.  However, Spira (2003) argues that the audit committee role is advisory 
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and largely reactive. Spira and Bender (2004) similarly note that the audit committee 
is concerned with accountability and supervisory roles and thus the role is focused on 
conformance or risk management rather than performance.  
 
Such an important agenda suggests not only the need for an audit committee to be 
formed but also for it to meet frequently enough to discharge its responsibilities 
effectively (see Xie et al., 2003) and for members to devote sufficient time to its 
activities.  The Revised Code recommends at least three meetings per annum for 
larger companies and at least two for those outside FTSE 350.  
 
The increasing technical demands upon audit committees have led to the requirement 
for them to have at least one member with recent and relevant financial experience. 
This requirement, introduced by the Smith Report (Smith, 2003), is supported by Xie 
et al. (2003), who found that the financial sophistication of audit committee members 
seemed to reduce earnings management by executives. Similarly, Mangena and 
Tauringana’s (2008) findings suggest that, along with independence, the presence of 
financial expertise makes a useful contribution to an audit committee’s effectiveness. 
 
Finally, although reference has been made to the “requirements” of the Revised Code, 
it should be noted that it is appended to The Stock Exchange Listing Rules (‘the 
Purple Book’) rather than a part of them. Adherence is thus voluntary. The Listing 
Rules simply require that a listed company should state within its annual report 
whether it complies with the provisions of the Code and, if not, which provisions it 
does not comply with and the reason for non-compliance (Tolley’s, 2002). This is the 
so-called “comply or explain” approach. 
 
Although a significant amount has been written about how audit committees should 
operate, relatively little has been written how about how they actually do operate.  
Gendron et al. (2004) got inside the “black box” (Spira, 2003) of the audit committee, 
conducting a field study of three Canadian audit committees, but there is little or no 
systematic research on many of the issues identified above.  This paper is therefore 
intended to make a contribution to understanding how audit committees operate, with 
a particular emphasis on how they responded – or not – to the Revised Code. 
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Using secondary data, the following eight research questions relating to the existence, 
composition and activities of audit committees are addressed. 
 
Q1 Do all companies have an audit committee, and how many members do they 
have? 
Q2 Are all audit committee members independent non-executive directors? 
Q3 Is there any relationship between non-executive directors who are audit 
committee members and the external auditors?  
Q4 How many audit committee meetings are held each year? 
Q5 Do companies disclose individual attendance at audit committee meetings? 
Q6 Are members of the audit committee on any other board sub-committees? 
Q7 Do companies have at least one financial expert on their audit committee, and 
do they name them?  





Different methods, both quantitative and qualitative, have been adopted by previous 
researchers. For example, some have used postal questionnaire surveys (e.g. Windram 
and Song, 2004; Pye and Camm, 2003), others have conducted interviews (e.g. Spira 
and Bender, 2004; Roberts et al., 2005; Gendron et al., 2004), while some have used a 
mixture of methods.  
 
Interviews can be very valuable in eliciting insights into the operation of audit 
committees, if the interviewees are able to speak with authority on the issues in 
question and are not too guarded in their responses.  However, it can be difficult to 
gain access, or even have sufficient time, to conduct enough interviews to provide 
confident generalizations.  Postal (or internet-based) questionnaires offer the prospect 
of much wider coverage, but there are problems in obtaining responses and the 
possibility of non-response bias.  Furthermore, where sensitive issues are being 
addressed, there is a risk of social desirability response bias (Fernandes and Randall, 
1992; Randall and Fernandes, 1991).   
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Interviews and questionnaires are not without value, but for this study it was decided 
to examine corporate annual reports. One reason is that some of the research questions 
relate to the matter of disclosure itself. Another is that data can be collected on a 
systematic basis and, though not infallible, are less likely to be subject to bias; this is a 
common benefit of using secondary data to research sensitive issues (Cowton, 1998). 
Previous authors have also used annual report data (e.g. Brennan and McDermott, 
2003; Mangena and Tauringana, 2008). 
 
The population from which the sample of companies was selected was UK companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange at 31 December 2004. Foreign companies were 
removed because their corporate governance is likely to be driven principally by their 
own national requirements. Some UK companies are listed on more than one 
exchange, but all the companies examined in this paper reported under the Revised 
Code. Specialist categories such as investment companies (850) and investment 
entities (890) were eliminated before 50 companies were selected from the remaining 
947.. The stratified random sample comprised 5 FTSE 100 companies, 11 FTSE 250 
companies (i.e. 101-350) and 34 others from outside the FTSE 350. Given that 
corporate governance practices of listed companies can vary by size (sometimes 
reflected in corporate governance codes), the stratified sample provided both good 
coverage and an opportunity to undertake further analysis of the results. 
 
The first year end for compulsory adoption of the Revised Code was 31 October 
2004. In order to get a sufficiently large number of companies operating under the 
new system, and bearing in mind the length of time that some companies take to 
publish their annual report, the sample selected from companies with financial year 
ends between 31 October 2004 and 31 March 2005.  
 
The annual reports were analysed and the data entered on a spreadsheet to facilitate 
quantitative analysis. Qualitative data, largely in the form of quotations from the 
corporate governance statements or directors’ reports, were also extracted. Finding all 
the relevant data in the annual reports presented practical challenges, since there is no 
standard content for corporate governance statements or reports; some was found in 







The eight research questions will be considered in turn, divided into three groups: 
existence and composition of audit committees; audit committee operation; and 
financial expertise.  
 
Existence and composition of audit committees 
 
Q1 Do all companies have an audit committee, and how many members do they 
have? 
 
All the companies, except one – Daejan Holdings PLC, a FTSE 350 company – had 
an audit committee. Daejan Holdings had only three directors – the executive 
Chairman, an executive director, and a non-executive director who joined the board in 
1971. The Board did not consider that non-executive participation would benefit the 
shareholders and stated that an audit committee would be introduced only when 
considered to be in the best interests of the company. 
 
Table 2 summarizes audit committee size for the remaining 49 companies. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
As might be expected, there is a positive association between company size and the 
size of audit committees; the mean number for FTSE 350 companies in the sample 
(see Table 2) is 4.06, while for those outside FTSE 350 it is only 3.30. However, only 
3 out of the 33 smaller companies (i.e. 9% of those outside the FTSE350) took 
advantage of the less stringent requirement to have only 2 NEDs (see Table 1). 
Indeed, Table 2 shows that most companies (43 out of 49, i.e. 88%) more than met the 
minimum requirement for the number of NEDs on their audit committee. Given the 
claims that suitable NEDs are difficult to recruit and should not be overloaded with 
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work and that corporate governance requirements are too onerous, this is a surprising 
finding and worthy of further investigation.  Perhaps some of the 21 smaller 
companies (64%) that only just met the previous, 1998 Combined Code requirement 
to have at least three NEDs on their audit committee will in due course take advantage 
of the lower numerical requirement introduced by the Revised Code 
 
Q2 Are all audit committee members independent non-executive directors? 
 
All the audit committee members were NEDs, but not all those NEDs were 
independent. Some companies may not have complied for part of the year but were 
able to rectify the position during the year or for the start of the next financial year 
(e.g. William Hill plc). Nevertheless, 3 companies included at least one non-
independent NED and it seemed unlikely that they were going to comply; they 
provided explanations instead. 
For example, Business Post Group plc stated that, despite his significant shareholding, 
a non-independent NED’s membership of the committee was appropriate because his 
experience and knowledge were invaluable. Henry Boot plc, a company with no 
independent NEDs at all, commented that the appointment of additional independent 
directors would lead to unwieldy board numbers and additional costs relative to the 
size of the company – though they stated that they might in future years bring in 
independent NEDs if there were shown to be compelling need or it were 
advantageous to do so.   
 
Furthermore, 10 companies included their non-executive chairman on their audit 
committee, which was not in accordance with the Code. However, the FRC has more 
recently amended the Code with regard to companies outside the FTSE 350, so that 
the chairman can sit on the audit committee if considered independent on 





Q3 Is there any relationship between non-executive directors who are audit 
committee members and the external auditors? 
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A review was made of information in the directors’ biographies to determine if there 
had been any recent relationship with the external auditors. Several directors had been 
partners in other audit firms, but the analysis revealed no case of a NEDs who had 
been associated with the current auditors. In this area, Tthe Revised Code is 
reinforced by the professional ethics requirements of the UK accountancy profession. 
 
Audit committee operation 
 
Q4 How many audit committee meetings are held each year? 
 
The Code states that there should be as many meetings as the audit committee’s role 
and responsibilities require; Xie et al.’s (2003) findings suggest that increased 
frequency of meeting can be beneficial. The Code recommends at least three per 
annum for larger companies and at least two for those outside FTSE 350. As Table 3 
shows, there was significant variation in practice amongst the sample of companies, 
with five holding as many as six per year. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The arithmetic mean of audit committee meetings per year according to Table 3 is 
3.58 meetings, which is broadly in line with, but higher than, Windram and Song’s 
(2004) finding of an average of 3.26 meetings per annum. At first sight this appears to 
be consistent with the Code’s recommendation that there should be not fewer than 
three meetings during the year. All FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies in the 
sample, 5 and 11 respectively, complied with the requirement to hold at least three 
meetings per year. One company outside the FTSE 350, the Durlacher Corporation, 
failed to reveal how many meetings the audit committee had held – nor did it explain 
why it did not disclose this information.  Of the remaining 32 smaller companies, the 
vast majority (26) held more than the minimum number of two.  Just one, REA 
Holdings, held only one meeting. It explained this by stating that members discharge 
their responsibilities by informal discussions and by holding at least one formal 
meeting in each year, as two of the independent NEDs are based in Singapore. 
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Of the 10 companies with the relatively high frequency of 5 or more audit committee 
meetings during the year, 8 were in the FTSE 350 and thus amongst the larger 
companies, which is consistent with Kalbers and Fogarty’s (1998) finding that 
organization size was highly associated with the number of audit committee meetings. 
Of the other two companies, for one 2004 was its first full year as a publicly listed 
company, which might explain the need for more meetings, and the other saw 
significant growth during the period under review.  
 
It is notable that 41.7% (20/48) of the companies for which figures are given, 
including many outside the FTSE 350, chose to hold more than three audit committee 
meetings during the year. Indeed, given that companies outside the FTSE 350 need 
hold only two meetings per year, 79.2% (38/48) held more meetings than the Revised 
Code recommends as a minimum. This suggests that they are not just meeting the 
bare letter of the Code but, perhaps, choosing to meet more frequently in order to 
fulfil their substantive responsibilities. Of course, they may simply be meeting after 
the main board or other sub-board meetings. This is an area for further research.  
 
Q5 Do companies disclose individual attendance at audit committee meetings? 
 
The Code states that a company should set out in its annual report the number of 
meetings of the board and the nomination, audit and remuneration committees and 
individual attendance by directors (A.1.2). However, of the 49 companies with an 
audit committee in the sample, six (12%) did not comply with this requirement.  
 
Q6 Are members of the audit committee on any other board sub-committees? 
 
Most non-executive directors are on at least one board sub-committee (audit, 
nomination or remuneration committee) and many are on more than one. 44% of all 
NEDs on audit committees were also members of both the remuneration and 
nomination committees, while 22% were also on the remuneration committee but not 
the nomination committee. For 10 companies there were no nomination committee 
meetings during the period, whilst 30% of companies did not have all the audit 
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committee members on the other committees. This appears to be the case for 
companies with a large pool of NEDs on the board. These are in line with the 
Hemscott (2003) survey, which found that in FTSE 100 companies approximately 
42% of NEDs sit on both audit and remuneration committees. They found for FTSE 
250 companies that it rose to 64%, which was similar to that in other listed 
companies.  
 
Details are not available in the annual reports regarding the time taken up by audit 
committee duties. However, Scottish & Newcastle plc commented specifically about 
the extra commitment entailed by committee membership, estimating one or two days 




Q7 Do companies have at least one financial expert on their audit committee, and 
do they name them? 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
Keasey and Hudson (2002) remark that it would be difficult to be an independent 
NED without a sound grasp of accounting practice. It is possible to be financially 
literate without being a qualified accountant, but given the technical demands of audit 
committee membership and, perhaps, the desire to demonstrate financial competence 
to external parties, it would be understandable if qualified accountants were preferred. 
 
The Code states that, “The board should satisfy itself that at least one member has 
recent and relevant financial experience” and requires a company to name its financial 
expert. Eight companies claimed that all the members had the relevant experience. In 
four of those cases it was possible to identify this experience from the biographies, 
but in the other four cases no information was available to substantiate the companies’ 
claims. This is consistent with the general finding of Brennan and McDermott (2004) 
that biographical disclosure varied and was often inadequate. 
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40.8% of companies specifically named their ‘expert’; in the majority of cases it was 
possible to discover that they were qualified accountants.  Another 38.7% failed to 
name or provide any details of the ‘expert’, but it was again possible to find out that 
the majority of companies did have at least one qualified accountant on the audit 
committee. 
 
Table 4 shows that two companies had no NEDs with recent and relevant financial 
experience, but they stated that they were actively seeking to recruit.  Investec plc 
seemed to be encountering problems in securing suitable candidates and were 
considering the appointment of an external search consultancy to assist with this. 
Geest plc and Collins Stewart Tullet plc provide explanation of not having a ‘financial 
expert’ on the audit committee following the expiry of their term of office; the former 
selecting to do without an expert and the latter requesting the Chairman to continue to 
chair the audit committee as he was the only NED who could be classified as a 
‘financial expert’. 
 
Q8 What are the relevant expertise and qualifications of ‘financial experts’?  
 
As can be seen from Table 4, at least 29 (61.7%) companies have qualified 
accountants on the audit committee.  However, the quality of disclosure in this area is 
not as high as for other issues covered by this paper, so for many companies it is not 





Having presented the answers to the research questions developed in relation to the 
Revised Code and the literature, the findings will now be discussed in more depth. 
 
The research of Chen et al. (2008) suggests that having an audit committee can bring 
financial benefits to a company. However, in itself this will not bring competitive 
advantage, for our research confirms previous findings (Hemscott, 2003; Spira and 
Bender, 2004) that audit committees are now a well-established component of the 
corporate governance of UK listed companies, consistent with the guidelines provided 
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by the Revised Code.  (Only one company in our sample did not have an audit 
committee.)  Our findings add to previous research by showing the widespread 
presence of audit committees is the case not just for FTSE 100 and FTSE 350 
companies, but also for smaller listed companies.  However, there was some evidence 
of a size effect, with audit committees of larger companies tending to have larger 
memberships and to hold more meetings. The latter might help to reduce earnings 
management (Xie et al., 2003), though it is possible that, with a larger company and 
its complexities, the audit committee needs to make more effort to hold earnings 
management at a certain level. 
 
All audit committee members were found to be non-executives directors (NEDs) and 
no evidence was found of any relationship between an audit committee member and 
the external auditors.  This might be reassuring to those who, mindful of the agency 
problems of the modern corporation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), view audit 
committees as having an important monitoring, supervisory or conformance role to 
play (see Spira and Bender, 2004). However, in the case of a minority of companies, 
not all audit committee members were independent according to the terms of the 
Code, which entails the risk that their objectivity and effectiveness in monitoring 
could be undermined, to the detriment of performance (see Chan and Li, 2008; 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2008).  In some cases this appeared to be a temporary or 
transitional stage, but there was also evidence that some companies disagreed with the 
Code, particularly in relation to length of “association”.  This was an area, therefore, 
where some companies chose to explain rather than comply, which is entirely 
consistent with a principles-based code.  Nevertheless, where a particular 
recommended practice becomes widespread it is increasingly likely to be regarded as 
normative and hence explanations for non-compliance or deviation have more work to 
do to convince interested external parties.  In such cases, at least those parties have 
the opportunity to form a judgement based on the explanation and to respond 
accordingly if they wish. 
 
A rather more common deviation from the provisions of the Code was found 
regarding the company chairman; almost a quarter of companies within the sample 
had the chairman on the audit committee.  It is interesting, therefore, that the Code 
was being brought into line with practice (albeit with restrictions regarding company 
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size) rather than vice-versa (see FRC, 2007).  At one level it might be argued that this 
is unnecessary, since compliance with the Code is not mandatory; those companies 
that do not follow a particular provision need only explain their reasons.  
Nevertheless, where such a large number of companies are non-compliant, it begins to 
call into question the authority and credibility of the Code and so adjustments come to 
be made. 
 
Another area in which companies were non-compliant was the disclosure of certain 
items of information.  In particular, several companies failed to disclose individual 
attendance at audit committee meetings and a significant proportion of companies 
failed to name their financial expert.  There are two points to be made about this.  
First, while the companies concerned disclose the existence of an audit committee, 
they are reducing the information available about its operation.  Second, there is a 
difference between these and other areas of non-compliance, referred to above, for 
those discussed earlier tend to come with an explanation.  One of the features of this 
type of non-compliance is that an explanation is not provided – perhaps because it is 
difficult to think of a suitable reason for not disclosing what the Code asks for and 
which most companies follow.  If the issue of non-disclosure were drawn to the 
annual report reader’s attention, it would be natural for the reader to react, “so tell 
me”.  On these issues of disclosure, then, “comply or explain” does not seem to be 
working; companies either comply (the majority) or they do not comply and do not 
explain (the minority).  It would be sensible for regulators to monitor this, provide 
more detailed guidance, and highlight examples of good practice. 
 
However, although the Code is part of a principles-based, “comply or explain” regime 
that does not require adherence to particular provisions, many companies were 
following much of the guidance.  Where they were not, there were two types of 
situation.  First, there were cases where companies indicated that were not complying 
but intended to do so (or had not complied until some time into the reporting period).  
Sometimes they alluded to difficulties in making a particular adjustment to the Code.  
This suggests that the initial period of implementation of the Revised Code was 
proving challenging or, at least, companies did not see a need to comply promptly.  
Such transitional problems would be expected to be temporary, and explanations for 
them if they were to continue into a second year would be unconvincing. 
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Second, some companies provided explanations regarding why they did not comply 
and, presumably, would not be complying in the future.  While it is wholly consistent 
with a “comply or explain” regime for a company to pursue a different course of 
action, in some cases the explanations did not seem particularly convincing or 
persuasive (see also FRC, 2007).  It is particularly difficult for companies to put 
forward a strong case when they appear to disagree with the principle expressed in the 
Code; in contrast, say, to an explanation that demonstrates how a given principle is 
being followed through a divergent action in their particular context.  Thus, for 
example, contentions that long-serving directors can still be independent would 
appear to apply to all companies or to none, unless some rather sophisticated 
reasoning – more than mere assertion – is brought to bear.   
 
Nevertheless, there is clear evidence of many companies complying with much of the 
Code.  It might be surmised that some are merely treating this aspect of corporate 
governance as a “box-ticking” exercise (FRC, 2007), but it is notable that in some 
respects (e.g. number of members and frequency of meetings) many companies are 
doing significantly more than the guidelines suggest.  Given the complaints that are 
sometimes voiced about “onerous” governance requirements, we believe it is one of 
the most significant findings of our research that so many companies are prepared to 




This paper has shown that many UK companies are following many of the provisions 
of the Revised Code, but there are areas of non-compliance.  In the most significant 
area of non-compliance (the presence of the chairman on the audit committee), the 
Code was being adjusted in such a way that the actions of most of the companies 
involved would in future be accommodated. 
 
However, the ‘good’ practices in the Revised Code are not mandatory, and we found 
evidence of companies choosing to explain rather than comply.  Some explanations 
expressed an intention to comply in the future, whereas others clearly signalled an 
intention to continue not to comply.  The latter explanations are not easy to construct 
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in such a way that they are convincing, especially when the non-compliant company 
is in a very small minority.   
 
Finally, although this research, like previous surveys, has focused on whether 
companies meet minimum specified or recommendations or requirements, it found 
that many companies go beyond the bare minimum, notwithstanding the complaints 
that have often been voiced about the burden of corporate governance. 
 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This study has several limitations, providing opportunities for further research.  First, 
although it has examined the operation of audit committees in greater depth than most 
other studies, it relies on secondary data; it has not attempted to go behind the 
information contained in the annual reports to delve deeper into companies’ practices 
and the reasons for them (e.g. why they do more than the minimum required to 
comply).  More work of the kind undertaken by Spira (2003) would be helpful to 
explore some of the issues identified here.  Second, the sample was not a large one – 
though, in contrast to other studies that have concentrated on FTSE100 or FTSE250 
companies, it was spread over all UK listed companies.  Third, in concentrating on the 
period when the last major set of changes was implemented in the UK, it has not 
provided insights into the most recent practice or practice in other countries.  Similar 
studies elsewhere would provide useful comparative insights.  It would be particularly 
useful to undertake follow-up research when any changes to audit committees brought 
about by the most recent review of the UK Code have been implemented.  Such 
studies such investigate not only whether companies meet the minimum standards 
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Table 1: Summary of the development of UK audit committee requirements 
 
 No. of NEDs Independent NEDs 
Cadbury Code (1992) At least 3 At least 2 
Combined Code (1998) At least 3 Majority 
Revised Code (2003) At least 3 for larger 
companies 
 






* I.e. those below FTSE 350  
 
Note: Further guidance on audit committees was published by the Financial 
Reporting Council in October 2008.  This did not represent a change to the Code 
as such and publication was after the date for which the research data for this 
paper were collected.  Any impact of the guidance takes some time to be reflected 
in corporate annual reports, giving reporting cycles and lead times. 
 
 
Table 2: Size of audit committees 
 
 
No. of non-executive 
directors 
No. of companies FTSE 350 Others 
2 3 0 3 
3 24 3 21 
4 14 9 5 
5 8 4 4 
Total 49 16 33 
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Table 3: Number of audit committee meetings 
 
No. of meetings No. of companies  FTSE 350     Others 
6      5                   4                    1 
5      5                   4                    1 
4    10                   4                    6 
3    22                   4                  18 
2      5                   -                    5 
1      1                   -                    1 
    48                 16                  32 
No details      1 






Table 4: Naming of financial expert and professional accountancy qualification 
 
          No. of companies 
All members claimed to have relevant experience 
Qualified accountant *                                      4 
No details available           4 
                                                                                                                   8 
Some claimed to have relevant experience and named** 
Qualified accountant         12 
No details available                 8 
                                                                                                                  20 
Not named/mentioned/detailed 
Qualified Accountant*                                             13 
No details available/or none            6 
                                                                                                                  19 
 
State no members with relevant experience                                               2 
                                                                                                                  49 
 
* Qualification determined from Directors’ biographies 
** Non-executive Chairman of the Board in one company is ‘expert’ and in another the 
‘expert’ is a non-independent NED 
 
 
 
 
  
 
